The upcoming EU-China summit slated for July 24 in Beijing has been tucked quietly among global headlines. António Costa, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, will first travel to Tokyo before heading to Beijing, where they will discuss important issues with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. Though the summit is dressed up as recognizing 50 years of EU-China bilateral relations, the mood for both parties ahead of the summit is undeniably gloomy. However, this article makes the case that the meeting need not have a doomed outcome, as many analysts have suggested.
Undoubtedly, leaders in Brussels face several daunting challenges: the war in Ukraine, a more assertive and hostile United States, and an emboldened China, whose export-driven rise to an essential nation in the globalized economy brings a number of problems to Europe’s doorstep. On the one hand, China senses it is now in a position of relative strength, especially after weathering the initial Trumpian trade storm and securing a win on American exports of advanced AI chips. China, in other words, can be more assertive with the Europeans. Trump’s trade actions against the Europeans— now a 30 per cent tariff threat—signal precisely the same sentiment.
Now, just a day away from the summit, there is little optimism that Europe can navigate these murky waters. However, this view requires conceptual reframing. The EU needs to approach China realistically and rid itself of the notion that challenging Beijing with a value-driven approach will lead to better and more secure outcomes. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the case of Ukraine.
China is highly unlikely to budge on its limited support for Russia’s offensive in Ukraine. In fact, only hours after Trump threatened tariffs against Russia’s trading partners, member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—of which Russia is a party—met in Beijing, where Xi said that China and Russia should seek to “strengthen mutual support on multilateral forums” and that “political mutual trust among member states has deepened.” This commitment followed a turbulent meeting between the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, where Wang expressed that it was not in China’s interest for Russia to lose its conflict in Ukraine, which he claimed would enable the United States to zero in on containing China in the Indo-Pacific. More than that, with an intense competition between the US and China taking shape, it is unrealistic to expect that China will cut ties with Russia in the face of American coercion, for both countries view their relationship as one of mutual convenience because of larger, structural, inconveniences; or in other words, a realist romance made in heaven. China is, therefore, more than willing to provide economic and diplomatic cover for Russia insofar as it serves the balance of power. When officials from Brussels complain, China can remind them of how they support US containment strategies aimed at curbing China’s rise and influence.
All of this is to say that the EU can’t have it both ways. They can't be Washington’s partner in containment and simultaneously demand that China make concessions that sacrifice its long-term security goals. Suppose the Europeans genuinely believe they can stalemate the conflict in Ukraine with enough support from the US (which they now appear to be receiving). In that case, the war should not be the main sticking point against China when EU leaders arrive in Beijing. Europe also has yet to offer a meaningful framework for peace, and has continuously supported Ukraine’s defense in the war, which, the longer it goes on, only aligns with China’s vision of a multipolar international world order that keeps the US distracted. Strategically, deeper integration with China on trade and technology could give Europe greater leverage over China’s relationship with Russia, working to the EU’s favor long-term.
But the issue of trade is a thorny one. The EU’s complaints include a large trade deficit, limits on its market access in China, coerced tech transfers, Chinese export controls on essential rare earth minerals, currency manipulation, and export dumping funded by state subsidies. For China’s part, its concerns center on keeping its market access in Europe—especially for electric vehicles and batteries—and eliminating anti-subsidy tariffs on these technologies. Europe ought to recognize its leverage here but refrain from exploiting it. After all, China exports critical rare earth minerals that are essential in producing both civilian and military technologies. While China badly wants to sell into the European market, the EU should recognize that playing hardball will get it nowhere.
China and the EU do not need to be friends to be friendly. In large part, the EU’s decreased bargaining power is a consequence of Trump’s trade crackdown, and the EU should make a concerted effort to bond with Beijing over this unfortunate similarity. One of the reasons why the EU is presently worried about export dumping is that China’s trade surplus means a diversion of goods will flood the European market, which data suggests is already happening. Chinese exports to the EU, for example, increased in both March (10.3%) and April (8.3%) which coincided with a 21% drop in exports to the United States.
If Trump feels that the EU is getting too cozy with China, he could opt for a sweeter deal with the EU, which would not only signify that the EU’s tough stance against the United States had worked, but that it could then take the same stance with China. Of course, Trump could act in an erratic fashion and punish the Europeans further, but this is why I stress that Europe should take the highest-road with the longest view. Often left out of these discussions are the structural differences between the United States and China. Whereas Xi Jinping has consolidated power and made it clear he will rule for the rest of his life, frequent political change in the United States means that planning ahead is a smart move. Trump, for example, has incredibly low approval ratings, and his party will likely lose badly in the 2026 midterm elections. Thus, it is not unwise to assume that the Democrats would quickly reinstate support for Europe, offering it a massive break as the bloc aims to deal with the giants to the east.
Though it is unlikely Beijing and Brussels will reach a rapprochement, it is essential for Europe that they adopt a balanced view and pragmatic posture, lest they get left behind more than they have already. If both parties walk away from Thursday’s summit with more relaxed relations, then both parties can begin to work constructively toward addressing each other’s concerns. On all fronts, Beijing is going to drive a hard bargain, and resorting to coercion will likely overstate Europe’s current capabilities. To the contrary, balanced and pragmatic diplomacy will be the most effective course, and may result in the Chinese undermining the leverage Europe does have. In any case, stuck between a rock and a hard place, it is not clear what other options Europe currently has.